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Abstract The focus of this chapter is in what role syntactic recursion might
play in the representation of propositional attitudes. Syntactic complements under
mental and communication verbs are recursive, and so also are the propositional
attitudes. There is strong evidence that children take some time to master the first
order syntactic complementation typical of verbs of communication. When they
do acquire these structures, the evidence suggests that this helps children reason
about propositional attitudes such as false beliefs. In this chapter we seek to deepen
our understanding of the crucial property of sentential and attitude embedding.
Is the crucial aspect that the truth value of the complement differs from that of
the embedded clause, or is it that both the sentence forms and the propositional
attitudes are recursive? We show that new insight can be gained by examining higher
order levels of both sentence embedding and propositional attitudes. Based on some
empirical data on second order complements and propositional attitude reasoning
in children, we propose that truth contrasts between clauses may provide a crucial
trigger for recursive complements.
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1 What Use Is Recursion?
The focus of our interest is in what role syntactic recursion might play in the
representation of propositional attitudes. Syntactic complements under mental and
communication verbs are recursive, and so also are the propositional attitudes:
1)

Peter thought that Kate believed that Bart said that Jill would write it

There is strong evidence that children take some time to master first order
complementation, as in:
2)

The girl said there was a butterfly in her hair (but it is a leaf)
What did the girl say there was in her hair?
(correct: a butterfly, wrong: a leaf))

When they do, the evidence suggests that this helps children reason about
propositional attitudes like false beliefs, namely that another person has a belief
that is false relative to what you believe.
In this chapter we ask what is it that matters about this first order relationship: is
the crucial aspect the embedding of a different truth-value in the complement than
the matrix clause, or is it that both the sentence forms and the propositional attitudes
are recursive? In this chapter we review the reasoning about the relationship and
its interpretation. The obvious question emerges: what about higher level orders of
both sentence embedding and of propositional attitudes? We review some empirical
data on second order complements and propositional attitude reasoning in children,
and propose that truth contrasts between clauses may provide a crucial trigger for
recursive complements.

2 The Representational Medium
To represent propositional attitudes in the mind requires a medium that can capture
all the subtle properties of intentionality, opacity and recursion (Fodor 1975, 2008;
Segal 1998; Collins 2000). Intentionality refers to the fact that mental states have
contents, and these contents can be not just singular things but whole propositions.
One can imagine an apple, but one can also imagine, or believe, or forget, that the
apple fell behind the sideboard. So the medium in question for representation must
be capable of representing propositions, that is, structured strings of symbols with a
truth-value. Opacity refers to the fact that the contents of mental states may in fact
be nonexistent in reality. That means one can have beliefs about nonexistent objects,
such as unicorns, or angels. Crucially, the contents of mental states look inwards to
mental referents, not outwards to external referents. For instance, the statement in 3):
3)

Peter believes there is a ball behind the sideboard
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is not false, even though the object in question is an apple. To Peter, it is a ball.
Finally, propositional attitudes are recursive, in that it is possible to have beliefs
about beliefs:
4)

Jill believes Peter believes there is a ball behind the sideboard

What kind of medium can these thoughts exist in? Images won’t do. Although
images can be recursive (e.g. fractals), and they can represent non-existent things
(e.g. a unicorn), they do not have a truth value, and hence cannot be used to represent
false or negative things (Fodor 1975).
Words won’t do. Lexical items are not rich enough to capture propositions. If we
want to say that John thought that his hat was his wife (Sacks 1985), we could say
he was deluded, or mistaken, but that would not capture the content of his mistake.
The contents of a propositional attitude are essential to its role in causal relations to
other mental states and to behavior (Collins 2000).
A sentence, however, is just right. Several have argued that natural language
sentences have the properties needed, although there is theoretical disagreement
about whether the representational medium is a Language of Thought (Fodor 1975,
2008), Logical Form in natural language (Carruthers 2002) or Total Forms of natural
language itself (Segal 1998; Collins 2000). But ordinary sentences have only a
single proposition, and to capture the contrast between reality and the false belief of
an individual, a complement clause is required if the meaning is to be conveyed in
a single sentence (see Hollebrandse and Roeper 2014, this volume, for the question
of whether discourse about false beliefs can be equivalently recursive).
The complements under verbs of mental state and communication have special
semantic and syntactic status. For example,
5)

Billy thought that it was raining

Even when the complement clause “it was raining” is false, the whole sentence
is not false. This is unlike e.g. an adjunct clause, such as one headed by when under
an ordinary, non-mental verb:
6)

Billy left when it was raining

If the adjunct clause is false, the whole is also false. The truth shift may be an
essential property that makes complement structures ideally suited for representation of false beliefs. Chomsky (2010) argues that Internal language [I-language]
evolved primarily for the advantages it conferred in reasoning. Here we have a case
in point. Whether or not this is true, the structures provided by I-language are ideally
suited for reasoning about propositional attitudes, though of course this reasoning
can go on unconsciously. Carruthers (2002) makes a related claim that reasoning
could be formulated as LF, and that only when it is cloaked in phonological form
do we experience it as conscious thinking (see also Jackendoff 2011). Critically for
false belief reasoning, the reasoner must be able to manipulate the content of a false
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proposition not just as false but also as causally related to the intentions and goals
of the holder of the propositional attitude. For example,
7)

If
Billy thinks that it is raining
Then
Billy will put up his umbrella/cancel the barbecue/put on galoshes

If the person had no way to hold that representation, but instead dismissed the
proposition “it was raining” as false, that person would be unable to either predict
or explain Billy’s behavior.

3 Developmental Data
Recursion is said to be a fundamental feature of human language (Hauser et al.
2002), and complements are also claimed to be universal by some linguists
(Wierzbicka 1996), though this is now in contention (Everett 2008; Sauerland
and Trotzke 2011). In principle, Universal Grammar? should provide recursion as
a fundamental. In actuality, the forms in E-language develop over the preschool
years, both in production and comprehension. This could be because not every
language has recursion of every constituent type (Hollebrandse and Roeper 2014,
this volume), so a child must proceed with caution. Or it may be that embedded
structures exceed the performance capacities of young children.
When do children get complements on the special class of communication and
mental verbs? Production data suggest that children start producing the forms
between age 2 and 3 years (Bartsch and Wellman 1995). However, the sentences are
often not false complements, but are more like “opinion markers”, or evaluatives
(see also Diessel and Tomasello 2001), and most often self-referent rather than
referring to others’ states of mind:
8)
*CHI:
*CHI:
*CHI:
*CHI:
*CHI:

what he xxx name # I [/] I think ?
I going make a trailer # I think
I think I will use dis [: this] color
I think you have sugar
I think I will

In work on wh-questions, de Villiers (de Villiers 1995) had explored how children
answer two-clause questions that require long distance movement:
9)

What did the girl say was in her cereal t?

These questions were initially just “control” questions for our work on barrier
effects on long distance movement (de Villiers et al. 1990). However, we realized
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that the children showed significant developmental growth in how they responded
to these questions, too. Critically, we introduced stories in which the person said
something false, because we needed to see if the trace of the wh-question was under
the scope of both verbs:
10)

The girl thought there was a bug in her cereal
But it was really a raisin
What did the girl say [there was t in her cereal]?

To get the right answer to the wh-question entails knowing that the clause is
embedded, that is, that the wh-trace is embedded under the scope of BOTH verbs.
In fact, children younger than about 4 years do not do this, but answer as if the trace
was only connected to the second clause:
11)

The girl thought there was a bug in her cereal
But it was really a raisin
What did the girl say [there was t in her cereal]?
Adults, 4-year-olds say “a spider”
Children below about 3.10 answer: raisin
[What] was in her cereal? D raisin

At first we thought the children’s errors might be due to a recency effect, so
we turned the stories around, but the same errors occurred (de Villiers 1999). Then
we entertained the obvious possibility that the young children did not understand
Theory of Mind yet. Perhaps they needed to pass false belief tasks before they could
answer the questions correctly.
In fact, the reverse seems to be true. Children pass these tests of complementation
before they can do standard Theory of Mind tasks. The contingency between the
tasks has been shown for:
A)
B)
C)
D)
E)
F)

Preschool-aged typically developing children
(de Villiers and Pyers 2002; de Villiers 2005a, b; Milligan et al. 2007)
Oral and Signing Deaf children, whether language delayed or not
(de Villiers and de Villiers 2003; de Villiers 2005a, b; Schick et al. 2007)
Children with language delays (LI)
(de Villiers et al. 2003)
High functioning children with autism (Tager-Flusberg and Joseph 2005)
Bilingual Spanish-English children (Hobbs et al. in preparation)
Training studies (Hale and Tager-Flusberg 2003; Lohmann and Tomasello
2003)

It is necessary to emphasize the results with deaf children in particular. We found
no delay in the development of false belief understanding in children who were
native learners of American Sign Language, but serious delays in children who were
learning English as their first language and thus quite delayed in their grammars.
These children are bright, sociable and adept at learning, so one might expect that if
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there were an alternative way to represent others’ beliefs (say by imagery, or acute
attention to eyegaze cues) they might spontaneously invent it, but they did not. These
findings are even more dramatic in the work of Jennie Pyers on the first cohort of
Nicaraguan signers, whose pidgin Sign was apparently insufficient even as young
adults for representing mental state language (Pyers and Senghas 2009).
A natural conclusion is that mastery of false beliefs rests on this aspect of
language: children need the structures to represent false beliefs. This conclusion
has been hotly disputed by other researchers who posit a role for language other
than the representational one that we defend here (Woolfe et al. 2002; Nelson
2005; Harris 2005; Ruffman et al. 2003), for example, arguing that language is the
medium by which we learn about the cultural theory of mind. It is also dismissed
by infancy researchers who find evidence of some sensitivity to others’ belief states
using eye-gaze measures long before infants have any capacity for complex sentence
representation (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Doherty 2006; Southgate et al. 2007).
For analyses of these and other objections see de Villiers (2005a, b, 2009; Perner
and Ruffman 2005; Hutto 2008; Low 2010; Apperly 2011). We proceed under the
assumption that for false belief tasks that entail a decision, which may or may not
be the only tasks that require representation, the evidence is strong for linguistic
complementation being a powerful predictor.
We have argued that sentential complements provide the structure needed to
represent the false beliefs of others, because they can embed false propositions.
But questions remain about what children know when they answer a question such
as 9) correctly. What kind of failure is it when children answer the question with
respect only to the lower clause? In recent work (de Villiers et al. 2011, 2012;
de Villiers 2009) de Villiers and Roeper have argued that children may obey an
idealization suggested by Chomsky (2005) as an outcome of the Strong Minimalist
thesis, that Phases should be shipped off to interpretation one Phase at a time.
As a consequence, children may commit a premature semantic closure of the
lower clause, a closure that is suspended in adult grammar to allow long distance
wh-movement in circumscribed cases like complements. Importantly, it is tensed
clauses that provide the occasion for this premature interpretation, not infinitives.
The presence of tense is associated with an assertion, a proposition, therefore having
a truth value:
Hypothesis 1: Mastery of a sentence with a false tensed complement clause is
requisite for representing false beliefs.

4 When Is Embedding Recursion?
Complements under mental and communication verbs are also recursive, so can
be used to report second, third, nth-level propositional attitude reports. The further
question arises, do children in fact recognize at the first stage that the complement
is recursive? Is embedding one complement enough to signal to the child that it is
‘recursive’? Roeper (2007) and Hollebrandse and Roeper (2007) argue that
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True recursion is infinite
Languages vary in which elements they allow to be recursive
Languages that disallow true recursion for some element may nevertheless
allow one embedding. For example:
Compounds in French: only ones are two nouns, and not free but idiomatic
Possessives with ‘s in German: only one allowed
Serial verbs in English: “come get” but not “come get eat”

The implication of their work is that being able to embed one complement does
not necessarily mean that the language has recursion of complements, if the rule
extends to all such cases.
If Roeper is right, then children may be conservative, that is, perhaps only
evidence from two embedding complements may provide the trigger that they
are recursive in English. These data are likely to be quite rare in the input.
Alternatively, perhaps sentential recursion is universal, in which case the child may
not be conservative and may generalize immediately. A third possibility is that
recursion of complements may be universal but lexically restricted, either by type
of verb or by type of complementizer, and children are conservative until the lexical
properties are established. Therefore we need to ask, is recursive complementation
available to English speaking children as soon as they get complements? Roeper
and Hollebrandse would argue that recursion is not automatically triggered – for
complements in particular – by mastery of one level of embedding.
Empirical data are thin when it comes to recursive complementation, and vanishingly rare in spontaneous speech of children and their caregivers. Several studies
were designed to see when children could handle such structures in comprehension.
Notice that mastery of the false complement structure can occur some months
before mastery of the false belief task (de Villiers and Pyers 2002). Perhaps a more
proximate cause of the change is establishing that complements are recursive. It
might be that recursion is the key to really understanding and representing false
beliefs at all. In other words, only when a child gets recursive complements does
she have the structures for reasoning about others’ false beliefs:
Hypothesis 2: Recursive complements are needed for level 1 false belief
understanding
However, there is another alternative. It is of theoretical interest to ask whether
there is any systematic relationship between mastery of recursive complements and
mastery of recursive propositional attitudes. Roeper (2007) has proposed that the
child may not in fact have recursion of either sentences OR propositional attitudes
when they pass first order complements and first order false beliefs at age 4. Perhaps
true recursion is later for both. One complement may be less clear in structure, but
two complements may prove to the child that the form is recursive.
In addition, several theorists of Theory of Mind have criticized the standard
false belief tasks as too low-level to really capture the knowledge of propositional
attitude reasoning that adults have (Dennett 1987; Hutto 2008). That is, there are
arguments on the other side about first order intentionality or propositional attitudes
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(Dennett 1987) being different in kind from second order and up. Essentially,
first order intentionality may not require propositional-level contents, but may be
reflected in the reading of a behavioral disposition (the “killjoy” hypothesis in
Dennett 1987). Imagine a 17-month-old human, watching a person fail to notice
a change in the hiding place of an object. When the infant then expects the character
to go to the place founded on their false belief/ignorance, this has been interpreted
as false belief understanding, as if the infant had the representation “Jack thinks
it’s in the red box” and that fed their eyegaze direction. But it could also be an
expectation based on intention understanding, such as expecting Jack to continue to
have the behavioral direction he had before. Developmental psychologists are hard
at work to distinguish the two alternatives empirically (Dienes and Perner 2002;
Baillargeon et al. 2010; Perner 2010; Low 2010). It may be that the child can
understand a situation by developing some mnemonic, or behavioral expectation,
based on a rule simpler than a propositional attitude ascription. Infants seem to be
doing just this as long as they do not have to make a decision: if they have to act on
the information, then it appears that language competence becomes entailed. In this
latter case, it is very difficult to tease apart what role language plays. Language could
be serving as a tool, providing a more effective mnemonic on a mental notepad.
For example, language might assist in the control processes necessary to select a
response (Jacques and Zelazo 2005), or it could serve as a way of keeping track
of abstract relations (Loewenstein and Gentner 2005) Or, it could be the critical
representational medium (de Villiers 2005a, b).
However, consider second order intentionality, as expressed in:
“Jack thinks Jill thinks it’s in the red box”.

At this point, simple heuristics such as following eyegaze or keeping track of
orientations seem very hard to track. Propositional attitude reasoning seems the
most likely alternative: one has to have a way to represent the fact that the content
of Jill’s thought is not in itself the content of Jack’s thought, and yet Jill as the
holder of the belief in question, and the content of her belief, are under the scope of
Jack’s thinking. There is no clear alternative to the complex hierarchical structure:
we have to know which agent has which belief and not confuse them. Philosophers
such as Dennett (1987) consider the breakthrough point in intentionality to be from
first to second order. It is clear that human language has the rich kind of structure
necessary for generating such a representation, for holding it in memory, comparing
and contrasting the contents of beliefs, and so forth.
First then, it might then be argued that true understanding of both complements
and false beliefs is established when each one can be shown to be recursive.
In addition, recursive complements are a most suitable medium for representing
recursive propositional attitudes. For that reason, Hypothesis 3 is a strong contender:
Hypothesis 3: Recursive complements are necessary for recursive (level 2C) false
belief reasoning.
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One last consideration is necessary before we consider the evidence. Perhaps
recursion is an incidental rather than significant feature of sentences such as:
“Jack thinks Jill thinks it’s in the red box”.

That is, what matters to its complexity is that the final clause is false, and therefore
we need to monitor who believes that. In sentences with single complements, the
falsity of the embedded proposition is a significant indicator that the clause is not an
adjunct but an embedded form. Adjunct clauses (e.g. because, so, when) must have
“true” as their truth value:
Jill thought that because the lid was open.

Extending this idea, the real trigger of recursion of complementation is the
recognition that the complement is false.
Hypothesis 4: In order to recognize genuine complement recursion, children need
truth-value contrasts between clauses.

5 Empirical Studies on Second-Order Recursion
In our first study (Hollebrandse et al. 2006) we tested whether second-order
complements (i.e. recursion in the syntax) was a predictor of false belief reasoning.
We tried to divorce recursion from falsity of the complements to see what was most
important, testing the various Hypotheses 1–4.
Hypothesis 1: Mastery of a sentence with a false tensed complement clause is
requisite for representing false beliefs.
Hypothesis 2: Recursive complements are needed for level 1 false belief understanding
Hypothesis 3: Recursive complements are necessary for recursive (level 2C) false
belief reasoning.
Hypothesis 4: In order to recognize genuine complement recursion, children need
truth-value contrasts between clauses.
We devised short stories in which different people spoke about what others
said, and rather than varying truth value, we varied the likely opinion of different
characters, to provide some pragmatic rationale for using recursive complements.
For example, Fig. 1 provides the picture for a short story:
12)

Billy is talking to Jane. Mom is cleaning up
Billy tells Jane that Mom said that comic books are stupid
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Fig. 1 A sample picture
from the second order
complements about attitudes
task (Hollebrandse et al.
2008) (Figure: author’s own)

Just as in the first order complement task, we asked a wh-question to elicit an
answer that would enable us to see if the child understood the embedding. We
devised two different wh-questions because some adults told us that the first type
of question was ambiguous:
13)

14)

Type 1: What Question
What did Billy tell Jane?
(Mom says that comic books are stupid/*comic books are stupid)
Type 2: Who Question
Who said that comic books are stupid?
(Mom/*Billy)

The results show that only by about 8 years of age were children successful at
answering the two kinds of questions (Hollebrandse et al. 2008).
A mistake that children commonly made was to answer with first order instead
of second order:
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Fig. 2 The bake sale second order belief task (Hollebrandse et al. 2008) (Figure: author’s own)

15)

Billy tells Jane that Mom said that comic books are stupid
What did Billy tell Jane?
2nd order:
“Mom says comic books are stupid”
First order:
* “Comic books are stupid”

It is very clear from this first finding that Hypothesis 2 is not supported by
these facts. The children aged 5–6 years were well above the age at which first
order explicit false belief tasks are passed. Therefore passing first order false belief
tasks does not depend on mastery of second order, recursive complementation.
Furthermore, second order complementation is difficult for children of this age even
when falsehood is not a factor.
But is second order complementation necessary for second order false beliefs
(Hypothesis 3)? Our second order false belief task followed the design of other such
tasks in the literature (Perner and Wimmer 1985; Sullivan et al. 1994) but we took
care to distinguish the possible answers to zero order, first order and second order
beliefs (Fig. 2).
16)

Second Order False Belief scenario
Bake Sale
Picture 1: Sam and Maria are playing together and look out the window
and see that the church is having a bake sale
Picture 2: Sam watches Maria grab her money and run out of the house and
over to the church. “Ah ha,” Sam says. “She’s going to buy chocolate chip
cookies, her favorite.” And then Sam goes back to playing with his toys
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Picture 3: On her way to the bake sale, Maria runs into the mailman and
tells him, “I’m going to get a nice pumpkin pie for Grandma.”
Probe: Does Sam know that Maria is going to get a pumpkin pie?
Picture 4: When Maria gets to the bake sale, she finds out that all they have
are brownies. So she couldn’t buy a pumpkin pie for her grandma, but buys
a bunch of brownies to bring back to her family instead
Probe: Does Sam know that she bought brownies?
1st order FB: What did Maria think (she) was (going to buy) at the
bake sale?
Picture 5: Back at the house, Mom comes in and says to Sam “I noticed
that the church is having a bake sale.” “Oh yes,” Sam says. “Maria went
there.” Then Mom asks, “oh, what does Maria think they’re selling at the
bake sale?”
2nd order FB: What does Sam tell his mom?
Why does he tell her that?
What is required to answer correctly? The stories do not use second-order
complements, so the task does not entail processing second order language. The
child must instead make the connection across the discourse in order to answer. The
steps are something like this:
17)

“Ah ha,” Sam says. “She’s going to buy chocolate chip cookies, her favorite.”
Sam thinks Maria wants to buy chocolate chip cookies
Sam thinks that Maria thinks they are selling chocolate chip cookies
What does Sam tell his Mom?
In other words, they must represent the second order belief:
Sam thinks [that Maria thinks [they are selling x]]

Hollebrandse et al. (2008) tested eighteen 6-year-old children on the following
tasks:
i.
ii.

Second order False Belief (4 stories)
e.g. What does Sam tell his Mom? (chocolate chip cookies)
Second order Complements (6 items)
e.g. What did Billy tell Jane? (His Mom said that comic books are stupid)

Notice in Figs. 3 and 4 that the children passed the first order false belief
question within the second order task at 91 %. Since these same children mostly
failed the second order “attitudinal” complements, understanding second order
complements does not seem to be a prerequisite for first order FB understanding.
In addition, we did not find that single complementation leads immediately to
recursive complementation. There is at least a year or two between mastery of
single complements with false propositions, and our second order “attitudinal”
complements task. Second, and highly surprisingly, we found that the 6-year-old
children were significantly better at 2nd order False Belief than at our 2nd
order attitudinal complementation task. This is contradictory to Hypothesis 3 that
recursive complementation is needed to represent second order false beliefs.
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Fig. 3 Data from Hollebrandse et al. (2008) on understanding second order complements with
attitudes (Figure: author’s own)

100

91.7

% answer

80
60.3
60
40
23.9
20
0
FB1st

FB2 1st order answer FB2 2nd order answer

Fig. 4 Data from Hollebrandse et al. (2008) on understanding first and second order false beliefs
(Figure: author’s own)

Why is the second order attitudinal complementation task so hard? Some adults
question our second order complementation task. Billy did “utter the words” that
“comic books are stupid”. Is this ambiguity the cause of the children’s errors? A
related explanation considers factivity: though say is not generally factive, a verb
like know reveals the impact of factivity in the second verb:
18)
19)

Billy told Jane that Mom said that comic books are stupid
Billy told Jane that Mom knows that comic books are stupid

In 18), the factivity of the lower clause is inherited by the embedding clause,
in that Billy could only say that Mom knows p if Billy also knew p. i.e. that
Billy also knows that comic books are stupid. Suppose children (and some adults)
consider “say” to have such inherited factive properties? In that case they might
answer that Billy said that comic books are stupid, and our attempt to manipulate
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attitude differences was ineffective. This raises a further possibility that ties in with
Hypothesis 4 and brings recursion back into the picture:
In order to recognize genuine complement recursion, children need truth-value
contrasts between clauses.
Suppose it is the case that the sentences we constructed for second order
complementation were not sufficiently marked as recursive because the truth value
was not contrastive.
20)

Billy told Jane [that Mom said [that comic books are stupid]].

The second complement could be argued not to have a truth value: it is Mom’s
evaluation, and we could merely disagree. Just as in the first order case, where
false complements permit false belief reasoning, perhaps genuine second-order
complements that mark mistakes/changes in truth value are the real prerequisite
for second-order belief reasoning.
21)

Billy told Jane [that Mom said [that it was raining]]. (It’s not.)

There is some evidence that evaluative verbs are (sometimes) not recursive. The
English verb “to consider” is not recursive:
22)

Billy considered Jane to consider comic books stupid

and the Dutch verb vinden (another evaluative) is non-recursive (Hollebrandse and
Roeper 2014, this volume). Perhaps only truth contrasts guarantee recursivity of
particular verbs. We need to test the relationship between second order complements
that mark truth-value changes, and second order false belief tasks.

6 Some Preliminary Evidence
The hypothesis is being subject to test on a large scale, serendipitously. As part
of an intervention study exploring the effectiveness of an integrated preschool
curriculum with a large sample of low-income children in Texas and Florida (de
Villiers et al. 2009), we designed language and theory of mind tests to be repeated
at intervals throughout the age range 2.5–7 years. As a consequence of the need to
test the older children, we developed extended false belief measures, using second
order belief stories, and we also expanded on our complement comprehension
measures so that they too were second order. This will allow us to test whether
second order complements that entail truth-value changes predict second order false
belief reasoning. However, at the moment we only have preliminary data as the
longitudinal study is not completely analyzed.

Recursive Complements and Propositional Attitudes
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Fig. 5 A sample series of pictures from the new second order complement comprehension task,
contrasting truth value (Figure: author’s own)

At the time of writing we have data on 191 five- to six-year-olds in low-income
preschools and daycares in Florida and Texas, being tested as part of a large NIHfunded study on curriculum intervention for school readiness. The children were
assessed three times during the critical year of intervention, and then once a year
later at follow-up. Ultimately we will have another year of follow-up data. These
data are from the first follow-up testing, 1 year out of the program.
Here we only provide a brief report of the results of testing the children as the
full results are still being compiled. In a large battery of cognitive, emotional and
literacy/language assessments, the children all received the following tests relevant
to the present questions:
a)
b)
c)
d)

1st order complements (de Villiers and Pyers 2002)
1st order false belief (a nonverbal analog of the standard task, see Schick et al.
2007)
2nd order false belief (Hollebrandse et al. 2008)
2nd order complements (contrasting truth (Hollebrandse and Van Hout 2009)

The latter task was devised to extend the single false complement task to second
order, and goes as follows. Three pictures (Fig. 5) are shown to illustrate a story
(23), and then a wh-question (24) is asked to diagnose the complements as before:
23)

24)

The woman called the policeman and said that there was a rat in her
backpack.
The policeman did not hear her very well and said,
“What? The woman said there’s a cat in her backpack! No, it must be a
scarf.”
But look. It’s just a stuffed toy.
What did the policeman say the woman said t was in her backpack?

First, consider the result in Fig. 6, demonstrating that the children have mastered
first order complementation as indexed by the standard wh-question.
We checked whether we obtained the usual contingency between passing first
order complementation and the nonverbal first order false belief, and the results
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Fig. 6 Evidence of passing first order belief in the longitudinal study (Figure: author’s own)
Table 1 First order complementation and nonverbal first order false belief

are shown in Table 1. Passing the nonverbal false belief tasks is contingent on
passing the complementation task, confirming previous results. As usual, we find
an asymmetry: some children can pass first order complements but still not pass the
first order false belief tasks.
What do the children do with the scenarios of second order complementation?
The question was for example:
24)

What did the policeman say the woman said was in her backpack?

The results so far indicate:
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Fig. 7 Results on second order false beliefs comparing two different populations (Figure: author’s
own)

29 % correct 2nd order D cat
26 % 1st order policeman D scarf
16 % 1st order woman D rat
15 % reality D stuffed toy
The rate of second order answers, 29 %, is still outweighed by a preponderance of
first order answers (42 %). Nevertheless, there is a hint that the subjects are doing
better on these second order complements than our earlier subjects did with the
attitudinal complements. This larger group can be claimed to be at a less advanced
stage of development than the sample of children tested previously; the largescale study is composed of low-income children from much more impoverished
educational backgrounds than children in our previous work (e.g. in Hollebrandse
et al. 2008). The evidence comes from comparing the two participant groups on
their performance on second order false beliefs in Fig. 7: clearly this second, larger,
group is not as advanced as the previous groups of children in their theory of mind
reasoning.
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Given that the present subjects are less advanced in development, then it is
surprising that their performance on the second order complements is at least as
good as the earlier group. The possibility must be raised that having truth-varying
complements may improve performance relative to evaluative complements, but a
new study in which both the stories and the participants are more closely matched
would be necessary to test it.
The second question was whether the new group’s performance on second order,
truth varying complements was better than, or preceded, their performance on
second order false beliefs. Comparing Figs. 6 and 7, three comparisons make this
point. We make the reasonable posit that on the second order task, second order
answers are better than first order answers, and also that first order answers are
more advanced than reality answers, even though they are wrong.
First, the percentage of success, that is, second order answers, is higher on the
complements task than on the false belief task. Second, the number of first order
answers is higher on the complement task than on the false belief task. And third,
the number of reality answers is lower on the complements task than on the false
belief task.
We suggest that mastery of recursive complements precedes mastery of recursive
false beliefs, but are they prerequisite? It is clear that understanding second order
truth-contrastive complements comes in before second order false belief reasoning.
However there are as yet too few passers of second order false belief to be able to
test Hypothesis 2 that recursive complements are prerequisite, as we would like to
claim.
Why are second order complements needed for second order false belief
reasoning? Remember that the stories do not use second-order complements: they
are covert. The child must make the connection across the discourse in order to
answer:
25)
26)

What does Maria think they are selling at the bake sale?
What does Sam tell his Mom?

We contend that the child must mentally represent the second order belief:
27)

Sam thinks [that Maria thinks [they are selling chocolate chip cookies]]

Children at 5 or 6 cannot yet do this. Second-order complements are not yet
securely represented (even with communication verbs) even when they are overt.
Until they can handle them, indexed by our comprehension test, children will fail
second-order false belief tests.
In another year, we will be able to trace whether there is a genuine contingency
between passing second-order truth-contrastive complements and succeeding on
second-order belief reasoning. All we can say at present is that success on
complements is “leading the way”.
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7 Conclusion
It is not recursion of complements per se that allows children to use them for
representing first order false beliefs. Hypothesis 4 finds support:
Hypothesis 4: In order to recognize genuine complement recursion, children need
truth-value contrasts between clauses.
With that acknowledged, we may find evidence for Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: Recursive complements (i.e. truth value varying) are necessary for
recursive (level 2C) false belief reasoning.
In both complementation and false belief reasoning, children first treat 2-level
embedding as 1-level of structure. It is as if one piece of the hierarchy is flattened,
or skipped over in parsing. Single level embedding, either of complements or
of propositional attitudes, does not lead instantly to second level, or recursive,
embedding.
We suspect that truth contrasts provide the key at two stages. Truth contrasts
provide the key that certain clauses are complements rather than adjuncts, allowing
the right structure to be constructed for first order complements under certain
classes of verbs. We have speculated that truth contrasts may also enable children to
recognize recursion of complementation more easily compared to propositions that
vary in evaluative attitude. Are truth contrasts between clauses then critical triggers
of sentence recursion? If this is right, then:
Truth contrasts -> sentence recursion -> false belief recursion.
This would occur at two levels, perhaps one at age 4 years and a second at age
6 years. Miller (2009), in a review of empirical work on second order theory of
mind in children, calls for more research in this domain. In particular, he argues that
the theories that explain the onset of first order theory of mind are often not easily
adapted for explaining second order theory of mind. The story presented here is also
incomplete and there remains much more to be explored.
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